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Weapcmjor Vidoru 



aUMV TALX& la • riuailied official publiiuitiAi of the Untied Smu* Sxe^ !■ tb I . 
lliMit^ af OpCEMbiBi. Tlie mAtetial canlauteii hcrdn may jkK be quoted or 1 1 imMlahi il^ !■ 
wlwh ar Id p*i^ HOT laay it be commimlcatcd, directly Ar lodirectlr) to jii i »iioi ml onlfcii in il 
t« (Wcliw to, except by authority of tlic ComnuiMtl^ Gcaenl, KTOUSA. 




AG 353 MGC " - " ■ ■,- ■ ." 2j Augiiii, 1943 

SUBJECT : E4h»cation in Mllittry «Bd Curwnt Afls:»i • 


TO : Comnuaidbg Ccncca], V Cteps 

!• In [he ttaiaing of the American soldier ihi purely miiitary and technical aspects 
>ir Dsuallj stressed. It is ess«i«kl, howfver, that in aJJkifliij lim soWier bit mentally 
pftpared for battle. He mvst kaow nod undentBiifi the vial neccssicy for the suc£c!;sfiil 
conchitfcm of the war. <: 

' , 1,' 

2. To udtt in accoTnpIishiaB'thls end, it ii desired dot you csiablidi nidun th<: 
cikments of your oonunaod a weody Educadan n'pgram to in^ud in all militaiT pcrsonBcl 
tbf following : 

a, CortftdcQcc in the commitnd, 

b. Fride ia service and a 5cii$« of pcTHmal participatiotL 
«. Knowledge of the causes and pnfresi of the war. 
d. A better undcKtindldg of ottr ilBc!. 

;. An interest in carrent crena tad thnr retatioa ts the trar and the cstablisbinenT 
of thiC peace. 

3. To farther th«e end?, each ae pttt a ie nttit commasdcr will arrange to have matters 
of current interest ■» (feMgnared in pangraph ac^ cf sod a atmve, and matters of leadership 
and confidcflo: ia the coouruud as indicated m fHntrwh ^ arid b above, difcus^cd 
periodically within his cocmnand. &ui^ dfecu^sioo atuull be by company commanders 
peiscinaUy or by selected Offioera and NCO's from the command as deemed best by 
the unit comtnand'fi'. It ii> desired to make it clear that the proper presentation 
of tbi» iXMterial is- a commajid function, and should be handled as such. You 
«re auili«rise4 t*d«viM9 om^i) kour wi tntiniaf ttaae per week t* this pntgram. 

4. The ^cial Sfn*e Scc^ioa, SOS. ETOUSA, »ill ^enrc and distribute the 
material for such veeklf ctisc^tajont, mainlaining in their djacremn ■ reuoBahte balance 
between the significance and progress trf military events and current events, reladon's 
with our allies, etc. This maieriSl will be dated arid deitf ^-red suftidently in advaiu^ 
for consideration by the staffs concerned at kast two days before tiltiinatc u*e. -^ ■ 

5. Direct cotninunicatiDn between your headquarters and Special Service Section, 
SOS, ETOUSA, is authorized in conducung this prcfgiam. 

6. In order w maki; the plan effective it will be necessary to provide and ttain an 
Education Officer of suitable rank in youciieadquarter&, and in each of your subordinate 
headquarters dotvn to and inctudiog divisjotis. 

By command of Lieutenant GciKial DE\'ERS: 

Lt. ColOTd, A/}.fe^ ■ 
Assistam Ac^idant Ceiiei^. 

It it t«gg&ttd tittt at$ distmsim yackr^aM tjhu aautv a* Om mtmmm iff hu 




l.K^D-L.KA!«iM. WKAPO!* F«il VliTOHV 

"CL'PK>SE my tieighlwr's house 
iJ catches fire, and I have a 
length of gardets hose four or five 
hundred feet away. If he can take 
my garden hose and coniifCl it gp 
with his hydraiH, I may help him 
put out the fire. 

"Now what do I do? I don't 
say to him liefore that opefiiiion, 
' Neighbor, my g;iirden hose cost 
me ?!>■>; you have to pay me $15 
for it," ^ 

The President Warns 

The President ijf the United 
Stales was talking to the reporters. 
It wJts Decwnl>er 17, 1940. At 
the lime he spoke, the most terrible 
conflag^ration the world had ever 
seen was already raging. It h;td 
irtarted in 193 1 with a small Rre in 
Manchuria that seemed far away 
and of no great concern to the rest 
of the world. Then in 1937, the 
fire of Japanese agression broke out 
again with new fury. 

As the vorld crisis steadily 
deepened in the 'thirties we were 
raced even more clearly with the 
brutal fact that 
there were 
three nations in 
the world deter- 
in i n e d on 
With the benefit 
of hindsight, we 
Americans can 
now see, of 
course, that had 

Thh isfue of ANJUY TALKS ftnvi^tf 
of an CTCt^f ff&rrt the book^ Lfnd" 
Lratr. fFtapOH fot Vittarj, by 
Edward R, Stfttinius, Jr., first Ltnd' 
Leoie adtninhlTaiar and now Undtr- 
Secrttury of Slafu in Washington. It 
rfcscribrj haw the United Stales realised 
thai danger thrcaimtd, and ofthe ntpi 
whith wfire taken both hrfort and 
after Pearl Harbor. 

we and the other democracies been 
willing to stop Japan in 1931, Italy 
in 1935, and Germany in 1936, by 
Ibrce if necessary', we would have 
been spared the necessity of figliling 
tlie greatest war in history. 

U.S. Couldn't Escape 

But it was hard for us, then, to 
accept the fact that there wert 
powerful patioiis in the world betif 
On a course of unlimited conquest — - 
by deceit, by treachery, by economic 
and political infiltration, and finally 
by force of arras. 

When the President said in 1937 
that if ihc aggressors really got 
going, " i^et no one Imagine that 
America wiU escape, that Aiii«rics 
may ext*^ct mercy, that this 
Western Hemisphere will not be 
attacked," most Americans, I think, 
knew in their hearts tliat this was 
so. But like tlie people of Britain 
and France, we hated the idea of 
war so profoundly that it was a slow, 
difficult process to ivalte up to the 
facts. Not until late in the spring 
of 1940, when Britain was left alone 
In mortal dangt?t 
and the control 
of the Atlantic 
was in the 
balance, did we 
A m c r ic a n s 
finally make 
up o ti r minds 
to prepare 
ourselves against 


Now in December, 1940J the 
United Stad^s was laced with another 
bnital fact, Bntiiiii, Cliina and 
the ntlier nuiions liiiLilitig the Axis 
could not c;et cnougli arms from this' 
counLiy to keep on fighting uiiless 
we Wiznnvz somclhitig more llian a 
friendly seller- on ;i business basis. 

It Was Like A Fire 

The solution which the President 
proposed io (he nution vt hii(\pr<rss 
coiilm-ncc on December 37, 1940, 
was enihodini in ^^^^_^^^__^^ 
his stoi"y ol" the 
garden hose ; wc 
should uct as a 
nation in ihr way 
that an individual 
American would 
act ifa raging fire 
had broken out 
in other houses 
near 1 > y, \V e 
should send ai! 
the cquipirient wc 
could possibly 
spare lironi the 
building of our 
own defenses to our neighbors 
who wKre already fighting the bUwc. 
We would defend our own home by 
helping them to defend theirs. 

As for the selitement, that could 
wait until the danger h;ul passed, 
and we could take stock of how we 
and Our ueighliiors stood. The 
proposal was the essence of what we 
now call " Lend-Lease/' 

Nazis Hit At Poland 

Hitler's Ibrces smashed into 
Poland, and two days later, in 
accordance with their treaty obliga- 
tions against this new aggression, 
France and Britain came to Poland's 
support. The President first pro- 
claimed the lunilrality of ihc United 
States and placed an embargo on 
all shjpmentii of arms to any of die 

Voh can hcighrei! She mi-ii's 
in the topic itf >hh Army Talks by 
expiainitig thai Lrrlil'Letise is a auhjccl 
of current difCttfsiov back botitf right 

A hi!l Io rFTiew the Fjind-Lrase aa 
{(IT one year Inyond June iQ haf 
btfti pending in Cangrtss* (Congrfis 
never gate the PrisiJeiil a hitsnket 
go'ahciid on lliis t}t!i!)i, h-til kerfts a 
check mi it hy tiuthoriztng kim to 
ffrtKtcd JTom year to year^ $0 Congress 
can slop Lend^Lemt if il fees fit.) 

Your men's interest will be fharpftted 
if you can help Ihrm IO fftl that they 
drf taking pari in it* 

IjcUigercDt nations, as he wai re- 
quired to do by the Neutrality Act, 
Then he called Congress to nicct in 
special session in order to recousider 
tin: ;irms embargo. " 

Agreement On Arms 

Those who wanted to amend the 
Neutrality Act diflcred mi how far 
American s«:iJii(y might require ua 
to go in order to prevent an Axis 
victor^', but they agreed tliat as a 
minimum wc should permit Faigiand 
arms here for cash 
and carry I hem 
away in their own 
ships. A r;;^!llup 
poll laketi after 
the war began in 
September indi- 
cated that about 
fio percent of ilie 
people were in 
favor of ■' cash- 
and-carry," and 
the votes in 
Congress to end 
the e m ba rgo 
reflected that division. On 
November 4, J93&, "cash-and- 
carry " becstnc law. 

Three days later a British purchas- 
ing Commission was established in 
the United States. The French 
COinbiried their separate porehasing 
agencies. There was a rising tide of 
French and British orders. Three 
times as many orders were placed 
for planes by the French and 
British in die flrst half of 1940 as in 
all of 1939 — over 8,000 planes and 
13,000 engines. 

HedJ Start For Plants 

As Secretary of War Stirnson 
said in a letter to Senator Georp;e in 
February, 1 941, while the Lend- 
Lcase Act was being debated : 
" You will realize that widioot the 

89 March, 1M4 

\f c;i d-st a rt 
given iiidus- 
tr)' by these 
fbrfig^n orders 
we would al 
ihe present 
time lie ill a 
very {i^avt; 
situittionas to 
the jiUirits find 
f a c i i i I i e s 
w h i c h w e 
now np("d ibr 
the present 

When I started to wort in 
Wnshiiif^toii in May^ i^^o, it seemed 
li> till' thru while "cash-and-carry " 
had been of aid to the nations 
fighting aggression^ up to thi^ 
point, it bad helped our own 
defenses a. good deaj more. 

The first deiiichnu-tUs n\ the 
survivors of Dunkirk came Kshfire 
at Dt»v<T on May 2q, 1940- Lelt 
on the roads at Dunkirk and on the 
be;K:hes were ^ill (heir liinks, iheir 
trucks, their artillery and most ol 
their lighter weapons as well. 

Not Enough Weapons 
Even For Home Guard 

. Ttiere ^vere not eiifiu^ii arms left 
in the United Kint^^oni to ren'tjuip 
Ihem, nuiCh less to provide arms Tor 
the Home Guard lieina; iiinliili^.ed 
with all possible speed. An urgent 
messiige came to llic White House 
from Prime Mitiister Winston 
Churchill. Could anything lie done 
to send more arms at once Ibr tlie 
defense oi Lnglnnd and uliat was 
left of France — if France held out ? 

Ordets went out from die Wlute 
Hou-tie for actiqn. The only possible 
sources of guns and planes for 
immediate shipment were our own 
Army and Navy stocks. 

A dozen ships s,iiled from 

eagerly lor the 

Gravcsend Bay 
and Baltimore 
with guns for 
BriLiin before 
the end o( 
June. Another 
1 >", freisfhters 
saiiing between 
July I and 
August I 
t(K>k what was 

A in i J 1 i o n 

empty hands 

r e a c li e d 

rifles as Hitter 

hesitated across the Channel, They 
went to men who almost literally 
had no arms ftt all in the most 
critical Iwur of Britain's history 
sijice die Spanish Armada skilled 
into the English Channel. 

ShiEinients Meant We 
Ri^atizeti Own Dani^er 

Most important of all, perhaps, 
was the promise implicit in these 
shipments — that America ^w In 
Britain's imminent danger the 
imminence of danger to herself. 

The most fundainenlal issice had 
lieen stated by tlie President on 
June rOj 1940 : " We will pursue 
two obvious and .simultaneous 
courses j we will extend to the 
opponCTits of Ibrce the material 
resources of ihis nation ; and, at the 
Siitne time, %i'e will harness aod sjM-ed 
up the use of those resources in 
order that we ourselves in the 
Americas may have equipment and 
training equal to llie task of any 
emergency and every defensse." 

By December, ic)4o, a majority 
of the American people, I ljH-lie\'e, 
had made up their miod.s that it 
was in our national interest lo 
continue the flow of arms to 
nations fighting the Axis. The 


promise of 
material aid * yy 

tokeepfiritain ^^jVtA' 
in the fight ^-^ 
was day by 
day being 
translated in- 
to a definite 
plan. But the 
macliinery for 
carrying out 
that plan had 
still to be de- 
vised. The most Immediate 
problem was one of dollars. 
By the end of 1940, Britain's 
war chest of dollan was 
down to almOEt t'WO biUinn, and of 
this nearly a billion and a half was 
already pled^d to pay for war 
goods ordered in United States 
but not yet paid for. By the middle 
of December new British contracting 
in the United States had practically 

Weapons, Not Money, 
Was The Real Need 

To meet tl»e dollar problem we 
could have made loans to Britain, 
as we had made loans to our Allies 
in the last wjir. At first glance, it 
was ii simple and convenient 
solution, but in reality it was loaded 
with trouble. We in the United 
States had discovered after the liist 
war how unworkable loans were 
when tlie war-debt problem 
brought economic dislocadon and 
disastrous misunderstandings 
between allies who should have been 
standing together to keep the world 
at peace. A fixed money debt 
would create the same difficulties 
all over again. 

There was another important 
reason for not making loans. The 
crux of tile matter was not 
doUars ; it w«« planes^ guiis ud 

ships. T o 

put aid to 
the countries 
holdii^g the 
Axis in check 
on a com- 
raercial basb 
would inevit- 
ably haniper 
us in achiev- 
ing our - real 
objective — to 
get enough 
weapons to (he baitlefronts to stop 
HEUTes.sion before it reaehed the 
Western Hemisphere. 

Arms Pool Suj*gestetl 

As tlie inareit of aggression con- 
tinued abroad, the country was 
coming to appreciate more fully 
the imminence of the threat to us 
if Britain should collapse. But a 
plan for furnishing her the arms 
she needed had still to be Jigreed 
upon. When the President retiirnetl 
fi'om the Caribbean on December 
1 6, 1940, he was ready to make 
a proposal to the American people. 

" Now, what I'm trying to do is 
to eliminate the dollar sign," That 
was the heart of the proposal. 

Tlien the President explained his 
solution in simple terms. Our 
factories were tuniing out munitions. 
The British were buying some of 
them ; we were buying the rest. 
From now on, tJie United States 
government should place all tlie 
contracts for munitions to be manu- 
factured in the United States. If 
we needetj them when they eame 
oil' the line, we would use them 
ourselves. If we decided tliat they 
" would be more useful to the 
defense of the Ujiited States if they 
were used in Great Britain than if 
they were kept in storage here," 
we could "either lease or sell the 

83 Harrli, IM4 

iiin ((-rials, subject to mortfr^pje, to 
llie people on the oilier side." 

" The defense of the Uatted 
States,*' and not dollars, was 
henccfortli to determine wlierc 
our weapons were to go. 

Tlien the Prcsidrnt summed up 
our national policy in a world of 
atj«jfr«-ssi(in : " We must be the 
great arsenal of democracy." 

VVitliiH three hours idler lie had 
sij^ned the Lcnd-Lea-'se Act on the 
alleriKVon of March n, 194.1, ^^^ 
President issuctl two tliicrtivcs 
piiHing the Leiid-Lcasc program iii 

Directive Numhcr One declared 
the defense of Great Britain vital 
to the defense of tlie United 
States. Directive Niintlxr Twu, 
alio dated March 11, declared the 
defense of flreece vital lo the 
dcleiisc of the United States. 


When ilif avir liwkc out in 
Europe, ftelinj; began to rise in Ifie 
{''rjikd Slaify thai, in nalionat 
ielf-interesl, f/te nations Jigliling 
the Axii sfiotrfd be aiiifd. At first 

ihf Neufratity Act had made the 
sale of arms I0 <iny helligtfml 
tmlau'fut. This Ad was amended 
to permit cask-^md-fany purdiases, 
tvhich worked to favor the Allied 
XglioiiSi bril SQmt proved inadequate. 
It was not enough to lend the hard- 
pressed firidsk the immey with ivhifh 
to make Jurlber purchases, A 
system was needed whereity aid 
could more ejfectit>ely and immedi- 
'ately be given. On Altirdi 11, 
|{>4i, the Lend-I^ase Act met tkts 
need and Amerira befione " the 
arsenal of Deniotraey." 

In what way was America's own 
war preparation speeded by Cash- 
aad -Carry, and later I^nd- Lease ? 
Why was it deemed inadvisable to 
lend friendly powers the money 
with which to purchase American 
arms ? What Allied military 
disasters spurred the desire of the 
American people to give Britain 
every possible assistance ? Is an 
understanding of the beginnings of 
Lend-Lease important to a general 
knowledge of the causes and 
progress of the war ? 

Germans Invade The Soviet 

Lend-L^ase and Russia. 
Envoys to Soviet. " Reverse 
Lend-Lease " is bom. Why 
the other side of the ledger 
is often overlooltcd. What our 
Allies provide — and where, 

'I'lie first Leiul'Leasc transfers 
hnd little efTcct on the fipjhtitig in 
Miirch and April, 1941. Wc liad 
too little to send, and we could not 
gpi El there last enough. Bui the 
inniiguralion of the IjCnd-Leasc 
program had an cnortnous eflect on 
the future course of the war. For 
the lirst time, the nations fighting 

the Axis were assured of a How ol 
arms with which lo carry on the 
struggle — a flow that would not dry 
up but, as the President was Inter 
to say in a I.end-Le;ise report (o 
Congress, would " awclcralc from 
day to day, until the stream Ijecomes 
a river, and the river a torrent, 
engulfing this totalitarian tyranny 
which seeks to doniin;i(e the world." 

There was one emergency in the 
spring of '941, however, that we 
were able to nifct Ijy using the new 
S 7,000,000,000 L^nd-Lease appro- 


priation, r This was the need for 
food of the British people, whom 
Hitler was seeking to starve into 
surrender by submarine warfare. 

U.S. Food Saved U.K. 

Between April 16 and Decem- 
ber 25, I94I, Letid-Lcase food 
shipments tided Britain over her 
most serious food crisis of the 

The event which had the grealest 
effect upon ihe planning and adrrtfhii 
lEtration of the I^nd-Lcase pi'o^am, 
however, was the Nazi attack pf 
June 22, 1941, upon tlie Soviet 
Union. As the vast battlfs on llie 
Kussian front proceeded, they caused 
a major revolution of rarlicr planning 
for the Lead-Lease prt^rani and 
greatly Pxpanded its liorizons. 

Aid from the United States to ihe 
Soviet Union Ix^an outside the 
Lend-Leasc prc^rani. In llie 

beginning, neither the American 
public nor the Government was 

ready (or a d«:tarati6n that the 
defense of the U.S.S.R, was vital 
to the defense oi" the United Slates. 
Furthermore, we had litdc we could 
send to the Soviets at once. We 
were straining every nerve to get 
the program of I^cnd-Lease aid to 
Britain and China to the point 
wiierc deliveries in substantial 
n mounts could begin. 

Red Mission In U>S. 

A Soviet militaiy mission arrived 
■ in Washington after a flight via 
Archangel and England. They were 
completely confident that the Red 
Army would not be smashed that 
summer and that it would be even 
strong enough to seize the initiative 
when winter cainc. This was brave 
talk at that time, with the Red 
Army reeling back aexoss the 
Ukraine and White Russia, 

It was, however, (jcncral 
Marshall's unhappy task to conviTice 
the Soviet envoys that die United 


MARCH 1941 -OCTOBER 1943 









t9 narih 1H4 

Statf^ [list did not Iiave fleets of 
planes and tanks, slncks of guns and 
l;x>mbs, iind great reserve stocks of' 
murliinery and niw iiirtU-riiil^ to 
send to Russia. No douLit (hey 
ejcpccKd to find lliat we li:td lie^iin 
lo mobilize our productive resources. 
Tlxcy had Ijcgun to iiiobiliw their 
production shortly alter Hitler t-ame 
to power iiv 1933. They did not 
uiider.<itand our position as an 
i:iE.ind cnnlinriit 
surr o u n d e d by 
seas thai had 
been under the 
control ofiriendly 
powcrsi for more 
than a century, 
and t h e effect 
thii^ had upon 
our thinking and 
OUT prepariiiions, 

it was decided 

to send a cttm- 

biiled Anglo-American mission (o 
Moscow 10 work out a kiiij^-riiiijic 
supply prtMfrilm for the Soviet o(< 
a le.illy large scale. 

Supplies For Reds 

At Moment Of Need 

On Oclolicr 30, (941, 10 day? 
after the return of the mi.ssion from 
Moscow, the President dispaltlied 
an liisLoric. messafj;e to i'rcmiiT 
SiaJio. The balllr Ibr Moscow was- 
at ii.s height- 1 lie NazLi were in 
Mozliaiiit, well pa-Sl Borodine, where 
Nii]'>oleon ovi;r a century In-Jore liad 
won llie battle that K'lVf biiri 
Moscow. I'he Red Army wa? 
striving desperately to prevent the 
closing of the pincen; that threatened 
the capital city on both sides. To 
the north, Leningrad was encircled 
and apparently dtximed. To (he 
south, Marshal Budy{-niiy*s armies 
had Ik-pu cut to pieces, the Ukraine 
was lost and Kbiirkov had fallen. 

summed af> in this mjmntr by Edward 
Sfettinius, forrrrrr admnistrator^ irt an 
ontifrrrsoTj hroadcaff lUarih If ; 

" Through Lmd'Ltasr and Rrrtrtr 
l-md'Lease »f arr making err tain that 
all our )rC)ifMHf d-rr itird whett thty 
will hit the tnrmj Ihr hardest, regard- 
lea (ifvkith country produces them nr 
whoie fortes emptoy them agaimt out 

Soviet casualties totalling more than 
1,500,000 men were admitted. Over 
the radio Stalin called upon bis pteople 
Ibr another supreme eHbrI to save 

Oil that day the President told 
Premier Stalin llial he had examined 
the record of the Moscow CJonfrrence 
and that : 

" AH of the military equipment 
and munition items have been 
appro\-ed, and I 
Iiave ordered that 
ita lar as ]>ossibIe 
t h c delivery o ( 
raw materials be 
expedited. In an 
ellurt ly obviate 
any fi 11 a n c i a I 
di(Iic:ulties immie- 
d i a t c arrange- 
ments ;ire to be 
made so thai 
supplies up to one 
billion dollars in value may l»c 
efiet'iecl under the lA-nd-l-r;*«- Act, 
I propose ihfit the indebtedness thus 
incurred l>e subject to no interest 
and that tlic payments of the 
U.S.S.R. do not commence uatil 
five years after the war's conclu- 
sion and be completed over a 
10-year period thereafter." Th« 
President indicated that the pay- 
ments would be in raw materials 
and other commoilities. 

Stuliii Sends Th:inks 

On November 4 Stalin replied -. 

" Your Jissu ranee that (he derisions 
ol th<r conlercnce will 1h- carried out 
to the limit is deeply apprecialcd by 
the Soviet CiovemTnent." 

The special terms fur the repay- 
ment of the billioiL diillnr credit 
agreed upon in (his cxcliani-ir til' 
telegrams are no loiiirer to ffl'ect. 
'I'hey were superseded on Jinie 11, 
1342, l>y the icinns o! the Master 


.-(■'^r-^v^i-'iajr""^ * 


Ijend'Lease Agreement concluded 
with the Soviet Union, U«dcr the 
agreement, our Lend-Lcasc arrange- 
mcnts "wilh Russia were put on llie 
sajue basis as tliose with Great 
Britain and China. 

Defense Of Russia 

Called Vital To U.S. 

The exchange of cominunicatioiis 
between Uic President and .Stalin 
was made public on November 6, 
and On the following day, the 24th 
anniversary of the Russian Revolu- 
tion, the President officially de- 
clBTcd tbe defense of the Soviet 
Unlan vital to the defense of the~ 
Uaiced States. The late of Moscow 
was still in the balance, but Russia 
had iroin U8 the assurance that 
the productive poiycr of this 
country was squarely and firmly on 
her side, and on a grand scale. 

Formality At Start 

In 194^, we and the Rus^ans were 
just beginning to learn to wort 
■ tqijether as allies. It would be foolish 
to pretend that our relations with 
Rassia were at the begin jiing as 
frank and as intimate as our relations 
with Britain and China. We did 
not ask the Soviet for the detailed 
irtformation about their army and 
about cuiditkins inside tbeJr country 
which we expect bwn other Lcftd- 
Lease countiks. ImOKdiate and 

complete pooling of information 
from liie start was hardly 10 be 
expected in Uie face of our laci 
"of mutual confidence in the years 

We must evaluate the inumacy of 
Our relations with our Soviet allies, 
I think, not by comparing them with 
our relations with other nations 
which have l^een on close terms with 
us for many deeades, but rather in 
terms of the distance wc have 
travelled in the little more than two 
years since Germany attacked 
Russia. VicAvcd In these terms, l)oth 
of us have come a long way in a very 
short time. We have both seen how 
closely our national interests ;ire 
linked together. 

Russians Make Good 

Impression In Talks 

I think our experience at Lend- 
Lease in dealing widi these men has 
been iltc same as that of other 
American officials who have had 
close and frajuent contact with the 
Russians. When a conference begins, 
they get right down to business and 
quickfy sliow themselves to be tough- 
minded. They are very serious in 
manner. Often they seem reserved 
at first, but give them plain, honest, 
hard-lweaded talk, and they will 
retura the laver. Tbt loiter we 
work together, the better we luider- 
stand each otiwr. 

29 March, 1944 

l^nd-Letise food sln{>T>tents were 
run llirmigh Ike IJ-boat hlotkade to 
HritvJn in 1941. The Russiam 
asked far aid wken Gemmny 
allacked the Soviet (Jnion^ but 
none could be t^iven at firfl. 
Commilmeais It) Bntain and Chma 
had to be fulfiikd, American 
produc/ion was not yet rolling. An 
Anglo-Ammcaa misnon to Moscow 
drtrijkd (he Russ'mn needt. On 
Oclolier 30, 1941, /fo Somet Uuim 
was promised miltlary equipment 
under f^rid-Leaie, when the dr/euse 

of thai country was declared viial 

to the defence of the United Slates. 

Rtitsian-AmericMi relations, at first 

confused, began to improve. 

How did Lhe American position 
differ from that of Russia in the 
matterof war preparation in 1941 ? 
What was the military situation in 
Russia at the time Lend-Lease 
arrangements were concluded Mvlfh 
Stalin ? What hampered American 
dealings with the Soviet Union 
primarily ? Do you believe that 
Atnericans arc gaining a better 
understanding of. their allies 
throug^h Lend-Leasc dealings ? 

We're Told: "Help Yourself 

As U^S. Forces in Briton 
grew larger, British supplies 
became more and more im- 
portant. Britain^s contribution 
is not as easily seen as ours — 
but it is there just the same. 
Congress gets the tally-sheet. 
Details of the trade. 
Reverse Leiid-Lease went into 
aiTtioii before ihc formalities could 
be worked out. 'ITien, late in 
February^ the Master Lciid-Lease 
Agref'iiicnt with Great Britain set 
down the over-all policy. 

"The United Kingdom," it 
stated, " will contiiiue to contribute 
to die defense ol the United States 
of America and the strengthening 
thereof and wi)l provide such 
articles, services, facilities, or in- 
formation as it may be in it position 
to supply." Besides continuing to 
fight our enemies, tfae British 
would help supply our American 
forces on a. full Lend-Lease basis. 
In the months that tbllowed, this 
broad geneQkl principle was trans- 
lated into actual working arrange- 
ments. As more Anjcrican Ibrccs 
reached the British Istcs^ procedures 

were w?orked out under which we 
could obtain etjuipmcnt and sup- 
plies that were available in the 
United Kingdom nicrely by going 
to BritLsh procurement officers and 
asking for them. 

During the seamd half of 1942, 
the size of our forces in the British 
Isles grew very rapidly as we 
prepared for the North African 
invasion and built up our Eighth 
Ariny Air Force for its part in the 
bombing of Cerinany. Reverse 
I^nd-Lease grew with equal 
rapidity, allhough neither the 
people back in the United States 
nor Cven the American Ixiys in 
Britain, I think, had any conception 
of its real extent. 

'I'he reaisons why Rcveree Lend- 
Lease "tended to l>e overlooked are 
simple. Th^ fighiing weajxjns of 
American forces are produced almost 
entirely in American factories. If 
the British were making tanks for us 
and turned over 3,000 of them, it 
would be easy for an American 
soldier to count them and say, 
" The British are certainly giving us 


a lot of stuff," jusL as we say it alwut 
ourselves "when we send 4,000 planes 
lo Russia. But we make all of thp 
tanks and practically all ol tKe 
planes, guns and other weapons for 
the American forces, and we make 
many of ihem lor the British forces 
in addition. It is true, ol' course, 
that the British have given us 
hundreds of Spitfires and other 
fighter planes, together with quanti- 
ties of bombs and artlUory, But 
these are the exceptions. Wlien we 

sec our men in 

the Britiiih Isles, 
almost all of them 
have American 
gun^, tanks and 
planes. It is 
natural to ask : 
What can Re- 
verse L e n d - 
Lease really 
amount to ? 

T\k answers to 
that question lie 
in these funda- 
mental logistical 
facts : armies do 
not just m^iracu- 
lously apjxiar on the figliting lines 
with their tanks and guns ; airplanes 
are not th<- only equipment an air 
force needs ; and a navy dtxs not 
fight with ships aione. Guns, tanks, 
planes and warships are thr striking 
power, but they art- only a pan o! tlic 
business of war. 

British Navy Helps 

Reverse Lend-Lease begins, as 
a matter of fact, as s«»on as our men 
leave their country for Britain. 
A large proportion of our troops 
have crossed the Atlantic on 
British transports, and the British 
Treasury has paid the charter 
hire. The escorting cruisers and 
destroyers have been assigned 
principally from the Britisli Navy, 

Thf Vfdlrd Stmtri mtd Brilatn hart 

ifitnt ithottf tht Htmt amount pf money 
on h*nd'lj!Sit mid to the {.fritted 

Pi'^ur^a on t^nd-Le^st exprnditures 
ihrotigh tke end of 194i, which art 
later than the onei tiled by Mr, 
Stelliniits in his hook, ihow that tlif 
UriiteJ Slaf*f ipeni ahoat U biiiion 
daftars on trnd-'L^asr to ^/ aitref. 
Of this, atmul 6X Uttton doKifTf 
rtprrsrrtts aid lo Brilitin. 

Britain through the tame period 
t/ifHt moTf than 10 Ulliim dolt art on 
Ltnd-Leaie lo tht Uniird Nations, of 
whith more than l\ hillion dollarf 
repreiTTtts «id to the VS. 

for the bulk of aar own naval 
strength has been in the Pacific 

Even Contribute Bikes 

Outside of the repilar run of 
Army aiipjdles. Reverse Lend- 
Leasc covers a multitude of little 
items that help make life easier 
for our soldiers in Britain — 
thou.sands of bicyclts requested by 
our Air Force so the groimd crews 
can get around the big air bases- 
Caster ; radios Ibr our men to listen 
to American pro- 
grams ; all the 
printing expenses 
of 'I'he Stars and 
S tri pes and 
Yank ; musical 
instruments f o r 
soldiers' bands ; 
athletic equip- 
ment lor soldiers ; 
recreation centers 
in British fiorts fc>r 
American sailors 
and m er c h a 11 1 


The first over- 

a 1 1 picture of 
Reverse Lend-Leasc in Brilain 
was given to u.^ in Washington by 
Lieutenant Goloncl George A. 
ypiege!i>erg, recorder of the United 
States Army's Purchasing Btjard in 
the Euroj>eaii theater, who came to 
Washington to testily during the 
Uongressional liearirigs on the exten- 
sion of the I.end-Lease Act in 
January, ig43- ^^ brought with 
him huge bound volumes which 
contained a complete record of 
Revt»rsc Lend-I-ease in the British 
Isles from June r to the end of 
December, 1942. There were 
literally thousands of pages, and 
every page bad a long list of 
supplies which had been furnished 
to our forces. 

For the House Foreign AiTairs 

f» ntUrrh, 1944 


Committee he picked out a few 
categories as samples. Beginning 
with " A," the Engineer Corps list 
ran through such items as asphalt, 
batteries, blackout cloth, ccmcntj 
coal, and so on down through the 
alphabet to wire, barbed wiro, 
sewing wire, rope wire and woven 
wire. For the Quartermaster Corps 
there were accommodation store?, 
bakeries, blankets, bleachj camou- 
flage, randy, canned heat, canteens, 
and then, skipping to the end of the 
alphabet, soap, tents, towels and 
warehouse equipment. The Signal 
Corps lisL Iiegan with aerials and 
ended witli wave meters. Ordnance 
began with ammunition and ended 
with torpedo tubes. 

USAAF Gets 'Chutes 

The Air Force received not only 
airplanes, but parachutes, dinghies 
lor forced landings at sea, new 

plexiglass noses for bombers, de- 
icing equipment, clay pigeons in 
astronomical numbers for gunnery 
practice, high altitude heated flying 
suits, and the famous British steel 
vests for fliers, made by a company 
that was making swords in the days 
of Queen Elizabeth. Then there was 
a long " Miscellaneous List " as 
well, with such itciiDS as smoke 
generators, acetyle,ne, eye shields and 
gas detectors. Some of the orders 
were itrihe hundreds of thousands ; 
others were for a dosten or less. 

First Balance Sheet 

Ijt. Colonel Spiegclberg brought 
back the fust full list of the Reverse 
Lend-T.ease supplies that we had 
received :n Britain and an over-all 
estimate of the amount of shipping 
that would have been required 
if wc had brought them all from the 
United States. It added up to 








The ipifroriffnce of Rererse Ltnd^Lense will brcoriK dearer when you use the diagram aboye 
Its a guidt to build a trude di^ay, tom'ssting^ oflwg packing eases labelled m abore. Where 
suth ttsntetiai anttial be obtmntd, reprodiicUpn af the dittgram oa a btofkboard wilt terre. 


1,121,787 ships* tons, the equiva- 
eat of over 370 full shiploads. 
Tliia figure did not include any of 
the construction materials the 
British had used in building 
airiield«j barracks, and other 
facilities for our forces, which 
came to more than another 
million and a half tons. Tliesc 
wt-rc impressive fimirt^, and they 
ha\'e since gone much higher. 

\Vc arc receiving Reverse Lend- 
Lcase in many other jKiris of the 
world — in Auslraliii, New Zealand, 
India, the Fijis and other Pacific 

Islanxis, Alricci, the Middle EaM, 
and elsewhere. I have lotd the 
British slory in such deiail only 
because it is tlicrc that Rt'verse 
Lend-Lease has been most exten- 
sively devdopcd. The same 
willingDess to make everything 
possible available to us with a 
similar saving of American dollars 
is to be found in other allied 
countries where our troops are 
stationed. We have signed Sj>ecial 
Reciprocal Aid Agreements with 
Australia, the Fighting French, and 
later the French Committee of 

Ut^PER SiAP SHOff^S how ihr United Stattt iirika at its entTnia—itfing Lcnd-Laat as a 
mutual Uniltd Nalioia furce fnr vitiory. lower map dtpicts what Iht Unittd Slain 
wrufd ftavt fmd (<• /oce t^tpt for tht agrrrmentf fy which we sent munilioni, fwi 
beforr our mm Wtrt irairi^d. Ciopy tbettt tm a ^lacJtb^arti or shtrt of paper to dramatize 

the pmtit. 

39 March. 1944 


National Liberation in North Airica, 
with New Zeatand, Be%iiim, and the 
Netherlands, as well as with the 
United Kingdom. Oilter agrec- 
meiits (ire beinjg; negotiated as n]Ore 
of our troops urc spni to other parts 
of the world. 

Russia And Cliiiia 
Give Needed Aid 

Even Russia and China, which 
have sTifTsred tremendous losses 
figlititig on their own soil, have 
givpn us war isuppJies and ser\'ices. 
The Chinese turned back to us as 
a £;irt all the P-40 pursuits which 
remained of those they InwJ bougiit 
from us, and they have turned over 
gasoline from their precious reserve 
stocks to our Air Force in 
China. We have had no troopjs in 
Russia, !>ut when Amcricaji vessels 
have put into Norlli Russian ports, 
the Soviet Union has met all their 
expenses — lucl, food and otlier ship 
stores, medical care, and any needed 
s!iip repairs. 

Extend Reverse Pact 

It was also during the summer of 
1543, after the British had completed 
dollar payments on most of their 
3,6oo,<x«jOOO dollars' worth of pre- 
Lend-Lease contracts in this country, 
-that Uwy agreed to extend the prin- 
ciple of Reverse Lend -Lease to 
include many raw materials and 
i'oodstulTs shipped to the United 
States, Until then they had needed 
dollars in exchange to pay for 
supplies ordered i'rom American 
manufacturers before Lend-Lease, in 
anticipatiori of their future dollar 

Now the United States will 
receive without itayment from the 
United Kingdom and its colonies, 
rubber, rope fibers, chrome, 
asbestos, tea, coconut, oil, c«coa. 

and many other raw materials 
and agricultural products for- 
mcrty purchased by United Stat^^s 
Govenunent agencies. Whenever 
British ships are used to bring 
these supplies to this country, 
they will be carried free of charge. 
Similar Reverse Lend-Lease agree- 
ments with other countries of the 
British Commonwealth covering raw 
inat(TiaIs and fijodstuffs are being 

All United Nations 
Joiti Supply Sharing 

The lact that we have received 
Reverse Lend-l..ease in substantial 
volume only from the Nations of 
the British Coinmonwealth does not 
mean that our other allies are not 
doing their full part to help us 
toward victory. The contribution 
which each of the United Nations 
is pledged to make toward com- 
mon victory is set forth clearly in 
the Declaration of United Nations: 
" Each Government pledges itself 
to employ its full resources, znili- 
tary or economic, against those 
members of the Tripartite Pact 
and its adherents with which such 
government is at war." 

Our other allies have siu'cly lived 
up to this pledge as well. Russia has 
been fighting on her own soil for 
two yeara ; China for six. Both 
nations have sacrificed millions ol 

lives and suffered the occupation 
atid devastation of many o[ ihdr 
greatest cities and intllioDs of acres 
of their best land. Because we have 
given them more Lcnd-I,ease aid 
th;jii ihey liave given in Reverse 
Lend-Lcase aid to us, we do not say 
tluil wc have done more than ihey 
have against our lOninmn enemy. 
We know thai ihey are pulling into 
this war e\'ery bit as much ol what 
they have as we are. 

Cost Of Lost Lives 
Can^e Be Easily Set 

It is all the same war. Who can 
say which of us has givt^u most of 
what we had to give ? We cannot 
measure tbeir lives against our 
dollaes, or their pounds or rubles 
against our lives. We eanncti 
hiilance the cost of a ruined city 
against the cost af ;i tiious;ind tanks, 
or the courage oi' the Underground 
in F.urope ugainsi ilic courage of 
Ainei'ican hoys in New Guinea and 
the courage of their niotliers at 

Unshown Bj' Letlgers 

It would be impCKssiljlc, indeed a 
Bacrilege, to attempt lo lialance 
such a ledger. All we can ask now 
is that all of us wc and the other 
United Nations — put everything we 
have into winninti; the war in the 
ways that circumntanees and our 
Strenofdi make possible. That is a 
combination which will balance out 
in victory. 

The United States has put into 
Lend-Lcase atwut 12 cents out of 
every dollar that we have spent 
to fight this war. By the middle 
of lft43— two years and four 
months after Lend-Lease began — 
the total cost of our Lend^Leuse 
■id amounted to 12,MM,OaO,$00 
dollars^ and that figure has since 


been going up at the rate of a 
little more than a billion dollars 
a laonth. 

This is the simplest measure of 
Lend-I.ease — the number of 
American dollar.'i that we have .ijient 


You can iltustraU f^affhicatiy and 
simply what Lettd'Lfiiite fiitJ.t ui in 
Telati^n to tmr tQiai war fxp^ifiiturff 
fty tiviiwinj^ on a blackbo&rd u Itirge 
circle to represent &ne daitttt sftent far 
war, and shading afiprwiimaitriy one' 
eigtitk of thf circle to represent ihe 
portion of that datlar (12 centa") s/>^nt 
on L&nd-Lettse. If no bItKkbmtTd is 
tmtiltilrlrt the samt drawiag cun be 
made with Mack paint pr heavy pencil 
on a sheet of wr^ippinj^ P'itp^r or 

Note the tKCompanying itluitrutioa 
as a guide. 

to produce the ^oods and provide 
the services that we have made 
available to our fighting allies. 
But it gives only a hint of the real 
meaning of nur aid, for we are not 
winning the war with dollars. The 
victories of the United Nations are 
won by fighting men using planes, 
tanks, ships and guns. In the last 
analysis, thjc measure of our Lend- 
Lease aid tnust be fourid in extra 
strtkinj^ power on the battlcfront.^ 
against our enenijcs, 

Thi.s is- the breakdctwn, therij of 
the i2,gcxi,ooo,rx>o dollars .total of 
Lend- Lease aid ■ 6,2oo,ooc>,otK) 
dollare' worth of planesj tanks, ^at^, 
ammunition^ ships, trucks, and other 

29 MRrrh. 1944 


fighting "supplies; 2,500,ooo,c«o 
dollars of raw malerials and indus- 
trial equipment ; 1,500,000,000 
dollars oi" food and otlier agricul- 
tural products ; 2,000,000,000 
doJlars of shipping, ship repairs, 
factories and oiliei- servico-. We 
provide these things under 
Lend-Lekse, because they fight 
for our cause just as our own 
soldiers do. A Luliwalle tjonihcr 
is no less mit of flie fight 
because the American gun that shot 
it down was maTintxl hy a Russian, 
A basft in New tjuiiiea is no less 
captured because surne of ihc 
Anieriran tanks that blasted out the 
Japanese were manned by 

Do We Get Worth ? 

We Americans are a hard-headed 
people, however, and the avi-mwe 
American will naturally say to 
himself : " 12,900,000,000 dollars is 
a lot of money. Have we got our 
money's worth ? " 

I think that we have in more 
d:an double measure. Tlvc total 
impact of Lend-Lease on our 
economy has been relatively small. 
The dividends it has paid have been 
enormous. We nre, it is true, 
drawing heavily upon our national 
rcsourc(^ to fight this war, mostly to 
arm and equip our own fighiing 
men, but also to aid our allies. 
If we had not had Lend-Lease, 
however, if Britain had gone 
under, Hitler had isolated Russia, 
Japan had completed the conquest 
of China, and Bnally we in the 
Western Hemisphere had stood 
alone against an Axis-dominated 
world, who can measure the ex- 
penditure of men and of our 
material wealth we would h«ve 
had to malce if our liberties were 
to survive ? 

The methods o! poiiticai 
collaboration necessary to achieve 
colfectivc security have sdll to be 
worked out. It will not Ise an easy 
task. Bvu with i!)c United Nations 
as a foundation we can accompiish 
it. Thiji is a responsibility that ihc 
peoplr, the Congress and the 
I'resident — all of us — will share 
logeiiier ibr our country. 

I^/Cnd-Lcase operations, as we 
know them now, will some day 
draw to' a dose, but we know 
already that die principle of mutual 
aid in mutual self-interest that is 
embixiied in ihe Lend-Lease Act 
must live on. Today there is more 
unity of purpose and of action 
among freedom-loving peoples 
than ever before, la that unity we 
can find the strength to build a 
peaceful world in which freedom 
and opportunity will be secure for 


iteuerse Letid-Lease was/onnaUy 
itt up in February, '94^- ^^^ 
people outside of governmeiil realized 
the scope of this plan. Reverse 
Lend-Leaa uflen begins with the 
transporting of American troops in 
British ships, under British naval 
escort. It iiKiudes literally litoits- 
aitrls i/J litiitia necessities mid war 
tupplies. Reverse Lend-Lease is in 
T'ffeU an figkiing fronts in oilier 
pfzris qflhg world. 

Docs the wise manner in which 
Lend-Lea-ie has been administered 
increase confidence in our govem- 
ment ? Should American soldiers 
he interested in the workings of 
Lend-Lease ? Do they appreciate 
the extent to which this program 
ts aiTecting the course of the war, 
and will aflect the establishment of 
the peace ? 


ONE of the mtwl vital factors in the strategy of the Unitts) Nations 
is I.end-Lcasc. It k ;i sLrytt-gy whith ii[ipii«i to all theaters of this 
war. Lcnd-I.e.isc was adapted out ol" iSic nPtfssity of pooling 
llierestmrcfs of frewloin-loving nfttions and usinpj these resources where they 
would count most iti dcrcating the enemy. It is a new strate^. If HiUer 
had known that this strategy was going to 1>c uMxl against liiiii, he might well 
have hesitated to start this war. But, in part because Trfrnd-I.ease is new, and 
ill part Ijecause it is still i>ein^ exiended, moat of lis know ittUe al>oul it. 
Ask the mail next to yoii what I,end-I,e;ise means to !iim. He will pr(»l>ably 
reply : " That's the way the Russians pet tanks," or " That'-f one of the 
■ways the United States Is supplying her Allies." These statemenis are 
true, but only pari of ihe iniih. It is the purpose of this issue ol' ARMY 
TALKS to help us learn the root of the matter. Our knowledge tif what 
Lend-I,ease is and how it works is lundainetilal to the winning of the war 
and the establishment of the peace. 

This is<iue of ARMY TALKS is taken verbatim from the book on Lend- 
Lcase by F^dward R. Slettinius, Jr., first Administrator of I^nd-Le-ase, and 
now Under-Secretary ol State, 

Vol. I, No. 5 of ARM^' TALKS, "How Lend-I^jise Works," should be 

reread by discussion leaders in conikection with this issue. 

Following are suggestions to discussion leaders in prefjaring for the 
second discussion of this topic - — 

1. Read over carefully the issue of ARMV TALK.S entitled "How 

Lend-I^ase Works." (Vol 1, No. r^.j 

2. Jot down the factual inihmiaUoi) avail^bfe there. 

3. Study the present issue in the light of these facts. 

4. On a blackl>oard .'.et up the charts ineUidect. 

5. Spread out the map, st) as to indicate the sea lanes along which 
Lehd-Lease operates. 

6. Emphasize the point that iiend-T^ease works Iwth ways — that the 
U.S. is on ifie receiving as well ;« the lending end. 

Prinict) by HrvD^s. Sc Prarsos Printlnis Co., Ltd.. Exfflooi street. II. CcnEinitoD, tmidafi. W.U. 

23 iUaiA. IMI li 

7. Specify some CDmitiodit]^ which \vc get from England — ccmstruction 
materials, buildings, air fields, food, ships ; irom Rusaaa — fud, 
food, medical care, repairs, ships' stores. 

f5. Stress (he saving^ in time, banking and intemadonal understanding 
that Lend-Lease provides. 

(). If you have a member of die group wlio has made a study ol'Lend- 
Leascj, ask him to ntiike a brief talk on the facts At the beginning of 
the discussion. 

!o. Keep in mind always that the fiinctioti ol the dis(!u*sion leader is to 
stimulate discussion. He is to guide quesdom and ansivers and to 
summarize the trend of comnaenf. ' Hfc is to maintain a neutral 
and iindominating position. He is Chairman. 

The questions that follow arc pfeparKl with both issues o! ARMY 

TALKS in mind. 


^%%\^ FOR THE DISCUSSION t/# #i 

(3. What is Lend-Lease ? Why is Lend-Lease r 

Q. How is it determined who gets what and when under Lend-Lea«e ? 

Q. What effect does Lend-Lease have on your daily life in the Army 
.^ , in the ETO ? Does it make any difference in what you eat, how you 
sleep, where you are stationed ? 

Q. Has Lend-Lcase cost the U.S. more than it has Great Britain ? 
China ? Russia r 

Q. Why is it impossible to judge who is benefiting most ? 

Q. What makes Lend-Lease valuable to all the United Natious ? 

Q. How does Lend-Lease speed up the efficieoey of the war effort ? 

Q. Will Lend-Lease prove to be a factor in post-war international 

If your copies of ARMY TALKS are hot reaching your unit in sufficient 
number, get in toudi with the field rcpreEcntative of Stars and Stripes. 



SEECAP is » honse orgsu of 
Special Service Dlvisioii. It !■ 
dlatriliuted tliraiigh conunaad 
Special Service Officers to eacli 
Special Service Officer of nnita 
down to and includliig reslmeiits, 
separate IwttaUons or similar 
orgauizatioiu. If ;oa are not 
rec«ivliis REECAP regularly, 
oommnnleate with yvar Com- 
maad Special Service Officer. 
Brief descrlptioiis of Special Ser- 
vice activities in your commaad 
wldclt ;o« think win be of Interest 
to other Spceiid Service Officen 
are Invited by the Editor. Com- 
inanlcadoai should Ik addreaaed 
in Editor, .RQSCAPiSMi* and 
Stripea, APO 887, U<ft. Acmy, , 

ARWlf TAIjKS !— The PURPOSE of ARXIY TAUKS u te help 
i^ofricin ofKccfi! and enlisted pereonnet beoooie bettcr-infoiroed taim and 
■MHncn aad therefore better soldien, 

ARMY TALKS are deaiKnod to stimuJate diecusston and lljou^i "Ad, 
by ti^ew very nature, thus may often be controvcrsia] in content. They tie 
not to prmwte or to pn^xtgandize any partkulsr causes, bcjiefs or thoixtiet. 
Kalbic, they draw upon ^ suitable sources far fact uid comment, to tlw . 
Affltoion tradition, with e«ch indiyidinl rctoiniag bis Ani«riciin t^^ and- 
heritage so fv as bis own opinioo is concerned. 

THEREFORE, the atatementt vtd opinions expressed ho-cin ate ttot 
negcMMtly veriikd by, nor do they neo^sarily refiecttlie opinioiu of, ifac 
it^fStrnJ gtates Anny. 

THK SOUSGE OF MATERIAL must therefore be roade dnr at each 
itia iwaiwi AH ^tten materia] appearing in tliu publication has beca written 
mul «dited by tjiniioimed members of the Army and/or Navy, except where 
it i* uifted tlut a chnlian oir (Mber outside source is.bejn^ quoted.